This paper estimates that Michigan's MEGA tax credit program to attract and retain businesses has large employment and fiscal benefits. MEGA provides discretionary tax credits to businesses, with the tax credit tied to the personal income taxes paid by employees on the new or retained jobs. We estimate the economic effects of MEGA using the Upjohn Institute's REMI model, and the research literature on how business location decisions respond to taxes. We estimate the fiscal effects of MEGA based on the research literature on how government spending and revenue respond to state personal income and population. The estimates suggest a lower bound to MEGA's effectiveness of being decisive in a little over 8 percent of the MEGA projects. Even with this modest success rate, MEGA is estimated to have fiscal benefits that offset about two-thirds of its gross fiscal costs. The net fiscal costs per job created of MEGA average less than $4,000 per job-year, which is less than the labor market benefits of job creation.
INTRODUCTION
This paper provides estimates of the employment and fiscal effects of Michigan's MEGA program. MEGA is an acronym for Michigan Economic Growth Authority. The MEGA program is a tax credit program that provides refundable tax credits to businesses for locating, expanding, or retaining jobs in Michigan.
The rationale for preparing this paper is that there has been no rigorous independent analysis of the net impacts of MEGA. There have been some recent independent analyses of MEGA (Anderson et al. 2010; LaFaive and Hohman 2009) ; however, we believe that these analyses of MEGA are flawed. The text of this report presents our analysis. Two appendices explain why these other analyses are flawed.
Obviously this paper's estimates are relevant to Michigan policymakers. Critics of MEGA claim that the program is expensive and ineffective-as evidenced by the state's declining economy-and thus should not be continued due to the state's ongoing budget crisis.
Indeed, MEGA's costs are increasing. MEGA cost over $114 million for 2007, the last year for which we have complete records of the program's costs. In addition, MEGA obviously has been insufficient to solve the Michigan economy's problems, as the state's economy has consistently underperformed relative to the nation's in recent years. Furthermore, the critics are right that with Michigan's troubled budgetary situation, all programs, including MEGA, should be carefully examined to see if they should be continued as is, reformed, or terminated. Do MEGA's benefits exceed its costs? How could its benefit/cost ratio be increased?
But evaluation evidence on MEGA also has national importance. MEGA contains several well-considered components that address some criticisms made against previous economic development incentive programs. MEGA tax credits are tied to the number and wage rates of jobs actually created by employers. MEGA credits are awarded after an econometric analysis that considers the economic and fiscal effects of the prospective credits for the state.
Furthermore, given Michigan's well-developed manufacturing base and high wages, any jobs created by programs such as MEGA are likely to have larger than average multiplier effects.
Finally, Michigan's economic woes mean that any jobs created by MEGA in Michigan are likely to have high economic and social benefits. In short, if a tax credit program such as MEGA cannot provide benefits greater than its costs in Michigan, then it is unlikely that other tax credit programs in other states will pass a benefit-cost test.
The paper concludes that MEGA passes a benefit-cost test. MEGA may or may not have a positive net fiscal impact; however, it does have a sizable job creation impact relative to its net costs.
Nevertheless, the evidence for our conclusion is inferred from other business location studies rather than from direct estimates of the causal effects of MEGA. If MEGA's effects are similar to those of state and local business taxes in other studies, it is likely that MEGA produces a considerable number of jobs at a relatively low cost per job, along with a sizable fiscal benefit.
It is even conceivable that MEGA's fiscal benefits are sufficient that the program pays for itself.
These conclusions are sensitive to the specific assumptions we make about what percentage of the jobs subsidized by MEGA are actually induced by MEGA, and about what are the multiplier effects of MEGA on the Michigan economy. This sensitivity implies that relatively modest changes in the program's effectiveness in tipping business decisions or the program's choice of projects might dramatically change the benefit-cost ratio. Furthermore, this sensitivity also implies that differently designed tax credit incentives, in state settings less favorable for incentive success than Michigan, may not have net benefits.
POTENTIAL BENEFITS AND COSTS OF TAX INCENTIVES FOR STATE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
State and local governments probably devote over $20 billion per year to discretionary tax incentives to encourage business growth (Bartik 2001, p. 251) .
1 What benefits might justify this sizable tax expenditure? The potential benefits of any jobs created by such programs are primarily of two types. First, any job creation due to these tax incentives would provide state residents with sizable labor market benefits. State job creation would help state residents by increasing the employment-to-population rate, both in the short run and in the long run. State job creation would also boost the occupational attainment of state residents, allowing residents to move up to higher-paying jobs. Second, any job creation and income creation due to the incentives may provide state residents with fiscal benefits. Tax revenue for state and local governments may grow by more than the public service costs associated with additional jobs and population. These fiscal benefits would allow either tax cuts or public service enhancements.
Some policymakers discuss tax incentives as if the incentives' main purpose is to make money for state and local governments. But research suggests that the labor market benefits of incentives are likely to be greater than the fiscal benefits. For example, one study (Bartik 2005) concludes that plausible earnings benefits from incentives are more than five times greater than plausible fiscal benefits.
1 Some researchers give higher numbers, as much as $50 billion per year (Peters and Fisher 2002) . However, such larger numbers also include many business tax credits that businesses receive as an entitlement as part of the tax code. We are restricting our attention to business incentives for economic development that can potentially be awarded with at least some discretion or selectivity.
Therefore, tax incentive programs that do create jobs can make sense even if they don't make money for the state or local government. The question is whether the social benefits from the job creation exceed the costs of the job creation.
The social benefits of job creation are likely to be large. Analysis by Bartik (2006) implies that the present value of the earnings benefits for state residents from the permanent creation of one job are around half a million dollars. Of course, not all jobs created may be permanent, which lowers the benefits of job creation. But half of these earnings benefits occur in the first 10 years after a job is created. The estimated effects of job creation on employment-topopulation ratios and occupational upgrading are sufficient to provide extra earnings for state residents in the range of between $22,000 and $34,000 per year during these first 10 years. It is important to recognize that these earnings benefits go well beyond the extra earnings of the state resident who does get the newly created job: benefits also go to state residents who are able to move up to better paying jobs when the labor market tightens.
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The costs of tax incentives are also potentially large. It is true that typical tax incentives are modest in size. The data indicate that the typical economic development incentive package might provide tax credits or deductions worth about $1,189 per job per year (in 2009 dollars) for about a 10-year period (Bartik 2006; Peters and Fisher 2002) . But not all the jobs subsidized by incentives will actually be induced by the incentive. Many of the subsidized jobs would have been created in the state without the incentives. Bartik (2006) concludes that the typical incentive package is only decisive 4 percent of the time; that is, 96 percent of the jobs would have been created anyway. Therefore the estimated social costs of incentives depend upon their effectiveness-i.e., the actual jobs created and not the often far greater number of jobs subsidized.
DESCRIPTION OF MEGA
The MEGA program was created in 1995. MEGA's basic concept is to provide discretionary tax credits to employers that create new jobs in Michigan, or retain jobs that would otherwise be lost. The credit amount is based in part on the personal income tax revenues for the workers associated with those new or retained jobs.
3 Credits can be provided for up to 20 years.
The credits are refundable against the state business tax; that is, if the credit amount exceeds the business's tax liability, the business receives a cash payment from the state government. Credits are not an entitlement going to all eligible businesses, but rather are awarded with some potential discretion by a state board. 4 The Michigan Economic Development Corporation (MEDC), the state's economic development agency, runs MEGA and regards it as one of the state's key economic development programs.
Eligibility for MEGA credits is restricted to industries that are thought to be part of the state's "export base" (industries that primarily sell their goods or services to nonstate residents, or that compete with businesses outside the state that sell goods or services to state residents).
value on employment, and that this social value is sufficient that the social benefits of extra employment may even exceed the associated earnings (Blanchflower and Oswald 2004; Frey and Stutzer 2002) . 3 The credit is sometimes above the personal income tax revenues of the workers at the new or retained jobs. For example, in some cases the credit is equal to the income tax rate applied to total salaries and wages plus employer health care benefits, which would not be taxed under the Michigan income tax. In addition, for high-tech and high-wage MEGA projects, the credit rate can be twice the personal income tax rate for the first three years. Finally, in earlier years there also were other business tax credits that were part of MEGA. 4 Although there is legally complete discretion, there are some unknowns over how much selectivity MEDC in practice exercises in awarding MEGA credits. The issue is not so much the MEGA board's selectivity, as one might expect most of the selectivity to be exercised at earlier stages of the project by MEDC staff. The issue is how many companies expressed an interest in getting MEGA credits but at some stage were discouraged or turned down by MEDC staff. This is difficult to ascertain. As will be outlined later in this paper, there are potential gains to greater selectivity in the MEGA program.
Retail businesses are generally excluded from MEGA. MEGA-eligible industries include manufacturing, mining, research and development, wholesale trade, office operations, and some tourism projects.
The program has some minimum job creation or retention requirements for a project to be eligible for consideration. These minimum job creation or retention requirements are relaxed for projects in rural areas, projects in areas that are designated as distressed by state government, and projects that meet criteria for being high tech or high wage. For businesses with existing operations in Michigan, the program also imposes requirements that the business maintain its base employment outside of the subsidized project.
The credit award can be more generous for businesses that are high tech or high wage.
Credits for retention projects also require that businesses make a minimum investment per retained job, with the credit amount tied to that investment per job.
The MEGA program's discretion in awarding credits allows it to consider a wide variety of factors related to the project's benefits and costs. The MEGA program is required to gather evidence supporting the case that the project needed the credit in order to be viable in Michigan, although how strictly this requirement is worded has varied over the course of the program. In addition, prior to awarding the credit, the state does an econometric analysis to show that the project will have a net positive impact on state revenues, considering both the credit costs and state tax revenue generated, and assuming that the project was induced by the credit.
The MEGA program has always operated with annual limits on the number of projects of different types that can be approved, or in some cases the number of "project years" of credits that can be approved. 5 More recently, the legislature has imposed some restrictions on the additional prospective first-year costs of MEGA credits that can be approved in any year. We obtained data from the MEDC on the actual MEGA credits paid, and the job creation and retention figures on which these credits are based, for each MEGA project for each tax year from 1996 to the present. Based on conversations with MEGA staff, there is usually about a oneyear lag in projects claiming credits, although it is sometimes longer. Thus, the record provided on MEGA credits and jobs created or retained is largely complete through 2007, but not for subsequent years. As a result, all of this paper's analysis is for the period with near-complete information on MEGA activities, the period from 1996 to 2007. Furthermore, although the credited jobs appear in the tax year associated with those jobs, the state tax expenditure for those jobs typically is incurred about a year later.
DISTINCTIVE FEATURES OF THE MEGA PROGRAM
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We simulated the effects of the MEGA program using the Upjohn Institute's version of the REMI model. The REMI model is a well-respected regional econometric model that has been widely documented in the academic research literature (Treyz 1993; Treyz et al. 1992 ).
We simulated the economic and fiscal effects of the MEGA program both by simulating the effects of any jobs created and by simulating the effects of how the MEGA program's credits are financed. It is critical to a proper analysis of the net economic effects of any government policy, program, or project to consider the complete effects of all aspects of the project, not just the aspects of the project that have benefits.
To derive the final simulation, we first did two preliminary simulations. First, we simulated the positive effects on the Michigan economy if 100 percent of the MEGA jobs were in fact created by MEGA. This simulation used information on actual new or retained jobs associated with MEGA by year and by the 70 REMI industries. Second, we simulated the negative effects on the Michigan economy of reducing government spending by the costs of the MEGA credits by year.
13 (As noted above, these costs are typically lagged about one year from the tax year for which the credits are awarded.) A reduction in government spending is the natural consequences of MEGA credits, holding tax policy constant. The REMI model structure means that the negative economic effects of financing through reduced government spending will be solely due to demand effects. Given the modest amounts of funds involved, it may be realistic to imagine that such spending reductions could be achieved through spending reforms that did not diminish public service quality appreciably over the 11-year simulation period. If public service quality was appreciably reduced, then the negative effects of government spending reduction could be much greater.
14 The net effects of MEGA on the state economy are then assumed to be equal to some proportion k of the direct effects of the MEGA-credited jobs, plus the negative effects of reduced government spending. The proportion k is interpreted as the proportion of MEGA-subsidized jobs that would not have existed in Michigan but for the MEGA program. That is, if the program had never existed, we assumed that the proportion (1 − k) of MEGA-subsidized jobs would have been created or retained in Michigan anyway, whereas the proportion k of MEGA-subsidized jobs exist in Michigan because of the program. We will discuss further below how we chose this proportion k.
It should be noted that the job creation impact scenario we used for the REMI model incorporated what REMI calls the "firm" method of estimating impacts. This method allows for some shock to employment in some firms in a state industry to lead to some substitution effects on other firms. That is, the REMI model incorporates the assumption that even if some MEGA jobs were actually induced by MEGA, some proportion of these induced jobs would reduce jobs in other state firms that compete with the MEGA-assisted firms in the same industries.
In addition, we should note that MEGA-credited jobs do not include all jobs related to MEGA, just jobs that receive credits under MEGA. For example, if a business in some year falls below the minimum threshold for new or retained jobs, or for base jobs outside the project, it will not receive MEGA credits for that tax year. However, it still could be the case that some of the jobs at that firm could be due to MEGA. In addition, after a MEGA credit runs out, a large proportion of the jobs at that business would be expected to persist for some time. Some revenue categories were assumed to respond to income, such as individual income taxes, sales taxes, and corporate income taxes. Elasticities of response of these revenue categories were based on the research literature. 16 Most other categories of revenue and spending were assumed to respond by the same percentage as the percentage change in state population. 17 One important exception is that these shocks to labor demand in a state were assumed to not have any effects, development benefits (Bartik 2006) . Therefore, if the financing were accomplished through reductions in preschool spending, the negative effects of government spending reduction would be much greater. 15 Note that if a company does not provide all originally promised jobs, but does provide the minimum required jobs, we only count the jobs that were actually provided MEGA credits. Jobs that were promised, but that were not created and therefore did not receive a MEGA credit, are not included in our analysis.
positive or negative, on categories of state spending related to welfare spending.
18 This is likely to understate the fiscal benefits of increasing labor demand in a state, as one might expect increases in state employment-to-population ratios and wage rates to actually reduce state welfare spending.
The amount in each revenue and spending category was based on data from the U.S.
Census Bureau's Census of Governments on total Michigan state and local government general own-source revenue, and direct general expenditure, for each year from 1996 to the present.
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For each year, using these revenue and expenditure figures by categories, we estimated how net state and local government revenue and expenditure would respond to a 1 percent shock to personal income, and a 1 percent shock to state population. Our simulations of the REMI model yielded percentage shocks to personal income and population for each year, which were then multiplied by our fiscal impact parameters to generate a predicted net fiscal benefit or cost for each year.
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We now return to the critical issue: what value of k, the proportion of MEGA-credited jobs that are actually due to MEGA, should be assumed to be valid? We first picked a value of k that would yield an average of zero fiscal effects over the 1996-to-2007 period. This was 18 The "welfare" categories are public welfare, health spending (but not hospital spending), and employment security administration. 20 A reader might ask, "What happens to these fiscal benefits or costs?" The REMI model treats fiscal variables endogenously and generally not explicitly. State and local employment and output is allowed to endogenously increase; however, tax rates are not explicitly entered into the model. Because the REMI model is estimated over pooled time-series cross-section data on U.S. states, the model implicitly assumes that fiscal variables adjust as they have historically with economic changes. As state and local governments have balanced budget requirements, the model is thereby implicitly assuming that state and local budgets remain balanced as revenues and expenditures adjust. Therefore, the model is assuming that state and local governments respond to any economic shock as they historically have done in adjusting expenditures or taxes. These adjustments are implicitly reflected in the final economic effects that are estimated. In other words, the model already implicitly assumes that any fiscal benefit will be used as such benefits have been used historically. But what value of k is plausible based on empirical evidence on taxes and tax incentives?
We have no good direct evidence on the causal effects of MEGA by itself. Such direct evidence will be hard to come by. It is obviously impossible to find a control group of businesses in Michigan. Comparisons of Michigan businesses with non-Michigan businesses need to take account of all of the many factors that differ across states, not just MEGA. Therefore, a good analysis of the effects of MEGA really needs to be part of a more general analysis of how state taxes and other costs affect business location.
The most comprehensive review of the research evidence on state and local business taxes and business location decisions remains the review in Chapter 2 of Bartik (1991) . This review attempted to summarize what a wide variety of studies implied for the long-run elasticity of state and local business activity with respect to total state and local business taxes: that is, if all state and local business taxes were cut by 10 percent, what would be the long-term resulting increase in the state's business activity? Wasylenko (1997) argues, we think persuasively, that a closer look at the studies reviewed in Bartik suggests that the most plausible estimate of this long-run elasticity is −0.20. That is, Wasylenko argues that if all state and local business taxes are lowered by 10 percent, the long-run increase in state business activity will be 2 percent.
As outlined in Bartik (2006) , these elasticity estimates can be used to estimate how individual business location or expansion projects are likely to respond to incentives. This estimation assumes that an incentive dollar is worth just the same as a dollar of lower taxes. MEGA is more likely to be decisive. This is the batting average of MEGA if we can view its 21 This batting average of 8 percent is about twice the percentage of location decisions that are believed to be affected by the average state and local incentive package. That percentage, as noted above, is estimated to be 4 percent (Bartik 2006) . MEGA is estimated to tip twice as many location decisions as the average incentive package choice of projects as being essentially random among all potentially eligible projects, or at least completely unselective with respect to the odds of tipping the project's location. If the MEGA program does a good job of using its selectivity-for example by selecting projects in which it is more likely to tip the location decision towards Michigan-it can improve upon this batting average. Therefore, it seems reasonable to view the 0.082 batting average as providing a lower bound to the plausible benefits of MEGA.
Why is the thus-estimated batting average only 0.082? This estimated batting average is so low because, from the perspective of business decision-making, a subsidy of $2,188 per job is not that big a subsidy. Therefore, if the subsidy is essentially handed out randomly to eligible businesses, we would expect the subsidy to have only modest effects on business location decisions.
However, even with such a modest MEGA batting average, the program would make back a considerable amount of money for state and local governments. For example, in 2007, when the gross cost of the program was $83.6 million, even if the program's batting average is only 0.082, the program's "fiscal benefits" (revenue generated minus service costs generated, for both state and local government) are $55.8 million, offsetting about two-thirds of the gross cost.
The net cost is only $28.8 million.
But this discussion so far is proceeding as if the only purpose of these programs is to make money for state and local governments in Michigan, which is far from the case. In fact, the main social benefit expected from such programs is in creating jobs, and thereby raising employment rates and occupational attainment for Michigan residents.
because MEGA is about twice as big in its annual subsidy per job as the average total state and local incentive package.
To look at this, we need to look at all years and a wider range of effects. We consider in some detail two possible batting averages. First, we consider the 0.082 batting average: the program has no selectivity effects beyond what would be obtained from randomly choosing projects among eligible firms. Second, we examine the 0.168 batting average, or what is needed for the program to have a zero net present value of fiscal benefits or costs averaged over the entire 1996-to-2007 period. This is arguably a feasible batting average. It is not inconceivable that wise selectivity in picking MEGA projects might increase the percentage of "decisive" MEGA credit awards from 8.2 percent to 16.8 percent, which only requires improving on chance in 8.6 percent of all projects, or less than 1 in 11. But even with a 0.082 batting average, the net fiscal cost over the entire 1996-2007 time period averages $3,490 per job-year. The cost per job-year is never more than $10,000 over this time period and declines to less than $2,000 per job-year in 2007.
Under almost any reasonable social valuation of the benefits of one job-year, a fiscal cost of only $3,490 per job-year seems well worth undertaking for such benefits. 22 Another possibility is greater selectivity with respect to which projects are most likely to promote new Michigan clusters of economic activity. However, this raises some difficult issues about whether the right new clusters can be identified by state policymakers. These issues go beyond the scope of the current paper.
5) The MEGA program's net benefits tend to improve over time. Multiplier effects take time to get underway.
CONCLUSION
MEGA has had net benefits for the Michigan economy. Our lower-bound assumptions about MEGA's impact indicate that, after one considers MEGA's fiscal benefits, it becomes clear that MEGA has created jobs over the 1996-2007 period at an average cost of less than $4,000 per year of employment created. The economic benefits to Michigan's residents of an extra year of employment are almost surely far greater than $4,000. As discussed above, we believe it reasonable that the economic benefits of an extra year of employment for Michigan's residents are over $20,000 per job-year. Therefore, MEGA has a ratio of economic development benefits to costs of at least 5 to 1. This ratio is derived from conservative assumptions that understate MEGA's benefits.
MEGA's net economic benefits are attributable to the program's emphasis on exportbase, high-wage industries with strong local supplier links in a Michigan economy that has historical strengths in manufacturing. The resulting high-multiplier effects mean that even modest effects on business location decisions-i.e., even a modest batting average-can cause the MEGA program to produce jobs at a low net cost per job created.
The MEGA program could be improved with some reforms. There are big returns to better targeting of the MEGA program at businesses with higher wages and stronger supplier links, or to trying to better target the MEGA program at affecting business decisions on the margin. More targeting of high-multiplier businesses is easier to implement than more targeting of business decisions in which MEGA is more likely to tip the balance. MEGA's multiplier effects can be readily measured using publicly available data. Whether MEGA is needed to tip the balance in some business decisions in part can only be determined with insider business knowledge, which is hard to come by. But the MEGA program could readily adopt procedures or formulas that either select more high-multiplier businesses or provide greater MEGA credits for higher-multiplier businesses. The problem is that counties with low MEGA usage are not a valid control group for determining the relative effects of MEGA in counties with high MEGA usage. The amount of MEGA credits in a county is not randomly assigned. To put it another way: every county in Michigan is equally legally eligible for MEGA, so there is no variation in the MEGA "treatment" across Michigan counties.
Actual usage of MEGA across counties could vary for a number of reasons. These different causes of variation could cause diverse, large, and unpredictable biases in using county data to estimate the causal effects of MEGA.
For example, if MEGA credits were randomly assigned among all growing firms, we might expect more MEGA credits in growing counties. If this were the main process determining MEGA credits by county, we might expect MEGA credits by county to be positively associated with county growth even if MEGA has no positive effects.
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Alternatively, MEGA might be most aggressively used in counties in which more businesses face economic challenges. If this were the case, then MEGA credits by county will tend to be negatively correlated with county growth. MEGA will look as if it is destroying jobs even if this is not MEGA's true effect. LaFaive and Hicks (2005) use instrumental variables to deal with the possible endogeneity of the MEGA credit variable. However, in our view, the instruments, which are mostly lagged dependent and independent variables, and variables reflecting MEGA approval of credits, are not convincing instruments. Ideal instruments would provide exogenous variation in MEGA availability that is uncorrelated with local growth trends, and we don't believe the chosen instruments do so. (Nor are we optimistic that there are instruments that will solve this problem.) LaFaive and Hohman (2009) control for local growth trends with predicted growth based on industrial mix. This addresses a portion of the problem. However, it is well known in the regional economics literature that industrial mix, while it is important, only explains a small proportion of local growth.
Appendix B Why Do the Estimated Effects in This Report Differ from Estimates in a Recent Report by the Anderson Economic Group?
We attempted to compare our results with the results from a March 2010 report completed by the Anderson Economic Group (Anderson et al. 2010 ). In the part of their report that analyzed MEGA, they reached a number of conclusions that imply that the MEGA program as it historically has existed, prior to the 2008 reforms in the program, has cost Michigan jobs and revenue relative to the alternative policy they consider of cutting the overall state business tax. On MEGA, the AEG report states the following specific findings on page 38:
We find that the Michigan Economic Growth Authority tax incentive program results in $44.5 million per year less in the short run (three years after abatement) in direct tax revenue in Michigan than would have been collected if the program was replaced with the alternative of an approximately revenue-neutral cut in the MBT for all businesses. This net direct tax impact is $57.9 million in tax revenue reduction by the tenth year after the incentive….We find that the State of Michigan has 8,248 fewer jobs…than it would have without [MEGA] in the short run, three years after the incentive. The impact on employment…is significantly more negative [in] the long run, ten years after the incentive. Table 1 of the AEG report states that the "direct employment gained… by replacing [the] incentive with [a] comparably sized tax reduction" is, for the MEGA program with a "10 year time horizon," equal to 17,739.
These results for jobs seem contradictory to the results we obtained in this report. In our Table 1 , we examined the effects of MEGA over its entire 1996-to-2007 history, compared to a counterfactual history in which MEGA tax credits were used to increase state and local public expenditure in Michigan. We concluded that a plausible lower bound to MEGA's effectiveness implied that MEGA, as it historically operated from 1996 to 2007 (and compared to this counterfactual history), has increased Michigan jobs. The estimated lower-bound net job creation from MEGA is about 10,000 jobs created after 10 years (2006) . 23 We attempted to understand the reasons for the differences between our results and the AEG results. Obviously, the different results are due to different assumptions. The question is which assumptions are more reasonable.
One factor that does not differentiate our report from the AEG report is the relative focus on the historical MEGA program versus the current MEGA program. Both our report and the AEG report are examining the MEGA program as it historically operated, prior to the 2008 reforms (AEG report, footnote 8 on page 6, and pp. 7-8).
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One significant difference between the AEG report and our estimates in Table 1 is our assumed counterfactual. Our estimates in Table 1 To explore further the reasons for the differences between our results and AEG's results, we tried to perform a similar type of thought experiment to that undertaken by AEG. The main 23 Our fiscal results may seem more compatible with the Anderson report's results. We concluded that the MEGA program had a net fiscal cost of about $35 million after 10 years (2006), whereas AEG concluded that the net fiscal loss was $58 million after 10 years. However, this is an apples-to-oranges comparison. Our results are with a government-spending counterfactual, whereas their results are with a business-tax-cut counterfactual. As will be seen further in this appendix, when we compare MEGA with a business-tax-cut counterfactual, MEGA had generated about $30 million in fiscal benefits for the state 10 years after the historical policy was introduced (2006), compared to the business-tax-cut counterfactual (Table B.1). 24 Furthermore, the difference between our results and AEG's results does not spring from our inclusion of data from the early days of the MEGA program. The AEG report states its belief that MEGA used to be more effective because it was more selective, and that the AEG estimates only apply to MEGA as it has operated since 2000 (AEG report, p. 38, and footnote to Table 5 ). However, as noted in the text, our impact estimates assume zero selectivity of the MEGA program in choosing projects in which MEGA is more likely to be decisive. If MEGA was more selective prior to 2000, then job growth by 2006 and 2007 would be higher than our lower-bound estimates. text of our report considers what would have happened if the state of Michigan had never had the MEGA program and had used the proceeds to increase public spending. In this appendix, we consider an alternative that is similar in spirit to that used by AEG: what if, instead of having MEGA, the state of Michigan had used the same amount of resource dollars to reduce the main state business tax?
We agree with the concept stated by AEG that policy analysis should incorporate a counterfactual. AEG states upfront in its report the following:
To truly understand the costs and benefits of a tax incentive program, we must compare it to the costs and benefits of an alternative policy. Choosing one policy means that you cannot choose the other, and both have potential costs and benefits. Comparing a program to a reasonable foregone alternative is a crucial and often neglected step in policy analysis. (p. 2) … Failing to compare the tax incentive to an alternative policy would have the unrealistic effect of ignoring the opportunity cost of not pursuing another policy. (p. 3)
We agree completely with the principle stated by AEG that any policy analysis needs to be compared with some "reasonable" foregone alternative. In the case of policies, such as MEGA, that involve a direct loss of tax revenue, the most "reasonable" and policy-relevant alternative is an alternative policy that uses that same revenue for some other purpose. Therefore, in examining the MEGA program versus a counterfactual of cutting Michigan's business tax, we cut the business tax by exactly the revenue saved by never having had the MEGA program. AEG appears to agree in concept with this approach, as it states that "the alternative tax policy was intended to produce an approximately revenue-neutral tax change" (p.
A-3). However, as we will discuss further below, we appear to disagree with AEG about what is required to produce an approximately revenue-neutral tax change. generate about 2,400 jobs, about one-fifth of the jobs generated by MEGA. Over this 10-year time horizon, the net effect on the state economy of an alternative history without MEGA, with lower business tax rates because of the revenue savings, would be to reduce the number of jobs 
NOTE:
The source for these numbers is the authors' calculations: see Appendix B text. The gross job gains for MEGA are effects after assuming 8.2 percent effectiveness and multiplier effects, but allowing for no opportunity costs of financing MEGA. The percentage business tax cuts are percentage cuts if MEGA was eliminated, and saved funds were applied to a business tax that raised the same real amount as the Michigan Business Tax raised in fiscal year 2009. The gross job effects of cutting the state business tax are those that occur if this schedule of business tax cuts started in 1997, ignoring any opportunity costs of financing these cuts. The net effect is these gross job gains from lower overall business taxes minus the job gains from MEGA. Finally, the fiscal effects of this package are the effects on state and local revenue minus effects on state and local required public spending to maintain service quality from the package's effects on personal income and population. instead the main state business tax had been cut, the net revenue effects for the state would be a fiscal benefit of almost $58 million.
Our estimated economic effects for across-the-board business tax cuts are derived using an adjusted version of the REMI model. We want our estimated effects of cuts in business taxes to be consistent with our estimates of the effects of business tax credits such as MEGA.
Therefore, we adjust the REMI model to be consistent with a long-run elasticity of business activity of −0.20. This requires slightly reducing the REMI model's responsiveness to business production costs, by about 16 percent. to run out. However, given that MEGA contracts run up to 20 years, with most 7 years and more, this policy shift would presumably result in counterbalancing increases in government spending or reductions in other taxes. The net economic effects of this different pattern of adjustment are likely to be slight. 27 We estimated this adjustment factor by comparing the REMI model's default employment response to lower business costs to what we would expect based on the −0.20 research literature consensus on the business location tax elasticity. Overall state and local business taxes in Michigan are $16.8 billion. A 10 percent reduction in overall state and local business taxes would be expected, based on the research literature, to boost Michigan employment in the long run by 2 percent. A 10 percent or 1.68 billion reduction in Michigan business taxes is equivalent to a 0.497 percent reduction in Michigan business costs, based on private value-added in Michigan. Based on the adjustment factor estimated in Helms (1985) , the effect after 10 years is likely to be about 61 percent of the long-run effect (see Bartik 1991, p. 236) . Therefore, we imposed a 10-year elasticity of −0.122, or 61 percent of the long-run elasticity. This predicted elasticity is about 84 percent of the elasticity generated by the unadjusted REMI model. Because of this, we adjust the REMI model estimates of the effects of never having had the MEGA program, and using the proceeds for a lower overall business tax rate, downwards by 16 percent. The savings from eliminating the MEGA program for each year from 1997 to 2007 are entered into the REMI model as lower production costs. It should be noted that results would not be much different if we used the unadjusted REMI model. The gross effects of lower overall business taxes would then be about 20 percent greater. In 2007, this would increase the gross effects of cutting the state business tax by about 600 jobs, which would only very slightly change the overall results.
it would take at least 10 years before most of the current MEGA costs were saved. Current Table B .1, this alternative policy only allows a business tax cut that would be equivalent to a tax cut much less than 10 percent over this entire period. MEGA was enacted in 1995. If the program had not existed, the resulting business tax cut, measured relative to the revenue raised by a tax such as the Michigan Business Tax, would have started out at only 0.06 percent and 0.18 percent in 1997 and 1998, before gradually growing to 3.83 percent as of
2007.
28 28 The AEG report acknowledges the existence of a "transition cost" problem for MEGA (p. 7). However, AEG does not note that the transition-cost problem means that its counterfactual 10 percent tax cut is infeasible relative to the historical MEGA program. The AEG report also argues that MEGA costs about $140 million (footnote 64 on page 31, Table A 2) Assuming business tax elasticities consistent with the research literature. The tax elasticity of −0.35 assumed by AEG for the Michigan Business Tax cut is far higher than the elasticities assumed in this report (see their Table A1 ). The AEG assumed tax elasticity appears to be both a short-run and a long-run elasticity of Michigan industrial and commercial business activity with respect to a change in one business tax, the Michigan Business Tax.
The long-run elasticity of −0.20 assumed in our report is from a research literature that tries to estimate the responsiveness of business activity to total state and local business taxes (Wasylenko 1997; Bartik 1991 (Phillips et al. 2009 ). The business location literature consensus thus implies that a business tax reduction of $1.68 billion, which is a 10 percent reduction, would be needed to increase Michigan business activity in the long run by 2 percent.
A $1.68 billion business tax reduction, out of total Michigan Business Tax revenue of about $2.26 billion, is a 74 percent reduction in the MBT. Assuming that a given dollar amount of business tax reduction tends to cause similar effects on business location, such a reduction in the MBT would be expected to increase Michigan's long-run business activity by about 2 percent. The implied long-run elasticity of Michigan business activity with respect to the MBT alone would be 2 percent ÷ −74 percent, which equals −0.027. This is less than one-tenth of the long-run elasticity assumed in the AEG report.
29
The AEG report also acknowledges that its procedures may involve assuming a "small" tax revenue decrease (p. A-3). However, the discrepancies between a 10 percent business tax cut and the feasible percentage tax cuts shown in Table B -1 are not small relative to the size of the MEGA program or the size of a 10 percent tax cut. 29 The AEG report refers to a research literature that maintains that the "tax-price elasticity" of business employment is between −0.1 and −0.6 (AEG report, footnote 67, on p. 33). In Table A -1, the AEG report chooses 32 Short-run elasticities would be even less. As mentioned, the available research literature suggests that the economy only gradually adjusts to lower business taxes. Helms's (1985) research, as reviewed in Bartik (1991) , implies that a business tax reduction will have about 61 percent of its long-run effects after 10 years. 30 The REMI model used in this report implies that the immediate effects of a business tax cut, after one year, will be about half of the 10-year effects. Thus, we might expect the short-run elasticity of Michigan business activity with respect to a cut in the MBT to be only one-third or so of the long-run elasticity, or something less than −0.010.
Thus, the elasticities assumed in the AEG report for responses to MBT reductions are over 10 times the long-run elasticities implied by the research literature on business location responses to business taxes, and over 30 times the short-run elasticities implied by the research literature. As a result, the implied effects they get for cutting business taxes are 10 to 30 times as great as one would expect based on the research literature.
tax-price elasticities with respect to individual business taxes in this range, with the alternative tax elasticity for MEGA exactly in the middle of this range, at −0.35. The −0.1 to −0.6 research consensus AEG describes goes back to the review of the business location research literature by Bartik (1991, pp. 36-44) , which reviews 59 studies of how interstate or intermetropolitan location decisions respond to state and local business taxes. Bartik (1991) states that "The long-run elasticity of business activity with respect to state and local taxes appears to lie in the range of −0.1 to −0.6 for intermetropolitan or interstate business location decisions…" (p. 43). But this elasticity is meant to apply to percentage reductions in all state and local business taxes. It doesn't make sense to assume that business activity will respond by as great a percentage to a 10 percent cut in a tax that is small as it will to a 10 percent cut in a tax that is large. In Appendix 2.1 of Bartik (1991) , it is shown that the elasticity of business activity with respect to a percentage change in some cost factor is likely to be approximately proportional to that factor's share in overall business costs. In other words, what really determines business location decisions is overall business costs, and a percentage change in some cost factor will have an impact dependent on how much that percentage change affects overall business costs. Therefore, the elasticities with respect to individual business taxes will be reduced below the −0.1 to −0.6 range. If a given business tax is only 20 percent of overall state and local business taxes, a percentage tax reduction in that individual tax will only have 20 percent of the impact of the same percentage reduction in overall business taxes, because that individual tax only has 20 percent as much impact on costs as total business taxes. The −0.027 elasticity derived for the MBT in this appendix is not only consistent with the business location literature, it in fact is derived from Wasylenko's argument that −0.2 is the most reasonable consensus value for the overall business tax elasticity, within the −0.1 to −0.6 range suggested by Bartik (1991) . 30 As mentioned in a previous footnote, the −0.1 to −0.6 range for the business tax elasticity refers to a long-run elasticity (Bartik 1991, p. 43). 3) Allowing for important multiplier effects of MEGA. The AEG report does not appear to allow MEGA to have multiplier effects. Yet regional econometric models such as the REMI model suggest that the MEGA program has sizable multipliers. We estimate that the employment model for MEGA is 3.88 as of 2007. By not counting these multiplier jobs, the AEG model understates the economic effects of MEGA by a factor of 4. This factor will tend to make the MEGA program look six times better in the AEG report than is assumed in the lower-bound model of our report.
On the other hand, the AEG report assumes that only 40 percent of these induced jobs are retained after 10 years. This would appear to mean that after 10 years, the percent of subsidized jobs that are actually induced is only 20 percent. This is a little more than twice the effectiveness assumed as a lower bound in the current report.
In the current report, jobs are only counted if they are still being subsidized by MEGA. Therefore, if the job goes away, so does any impact from the job. But the cost of the subsidy then also goes away.
Factors 1 and 2 affect AEG's impact estimates compared to our estimates for the alternative business tax reduction. Factor 1 would appear to cause the alternative tax reductions 31 It could be argued that the AEG model is symmetrical by not allowing a multiplier for cuts in the MBT. Yet such a multiplier is implicitly assumed in allowing the elasticity of response to the MBT cut to apply to the entire MBT base, not just the export-base MBT businesses. In conventional regional econometric models, the elasticity of response would apply only to the export-base sector, which would then have multiplier effects on the nonexport base sector. In some simple models, the multiplier would be assumed to be the ratio of the total business to be at least two to three times too big, and therefore the number of jobs gained from alternative tax reductions to be at least two to three times too big. Factor 2 indicates that the elasticities assumed in the AEG report are from 10 to 30 times bigger than are assumed in the current report, with the current report's estimates based more squarely on the research literature. Factors 1 and 2 together would appear to cause AEG's estimated economic effects of the alternative reduction in the Michigan Business Tax allowed by eliminating MEGA to be 20 to 90 times as great as are estimated in the current report.
Factors 3 and 4 affect AEG's impact estimates compared to our estimates for MEGA.
Factor 3 causes MEGA's effects to be one-fourth of this report's estimates, which incorporate multiplier effects for MEGA. Factor 4, on the other hand, causes the MEGA program to be two to six times more effective in AEG's report than our lower-bound assumptions. Taking Factors 3 and 4 together means that the AEG report's assumptions would be expected to result in MEGA effects from one-half to one-and-one-half times the current report's estimates (½ = 1/4 × 2; 1-1/2 = 1/4 × 6).
This analysis is very roughly consistent with Table B We will close on a note of agreement between our report and the AEG report. The AEG report argues that MEGA is more effective if it is more selective. As pointed out in our main tax base to the export-based business tax base. Assuming that the MBT elasticity applies to the total business tax base is equivalent to assuming such a multiplier effect.
